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BEYOND CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE: A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERNEST E. BUBB

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BEYOND CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE:
A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ernest E. Bubb, AR

Colonel Peter F. Dauber
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
2 April 1990

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BEYOND CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE:
A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Cheshire Puss," she began rather timidly . . . "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the cat.

--Alice in Wonderland

Lewis Carroll

The second half of the 20th century has been unique for the relative absence of war and armed conflict in Europe. As we enter the final decade of this century, much of the European security framework upon which peace and stability have been constructed appears to be crumbling. American commitment to collective security appears less manifest: The utility of nuclear deterrence is questionable: A divided Germany will soon reunite: The Warsaw Pact and NATO appear increasingly irrelevant as peace breaks out all over Europe. If the old order is rapidly falling away, what should the new order look like? Before we can answer Alice's question, Which way ought we to go from here?, we must come to grips with the Cheshire cat. "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."

This paper addresses those questions by examining the European security environment likely to exist in the initial decades of the 21st century, and proposing U.S. security policies and strategies for Europe appropriate to this new environment. The study uses a four part methodology:

- o Examine the historical context upon which the current security framework of Europe is constructed;
- o Forecast a vision of a new European security environment likely to exist in the initial decades of the 21st century, focusing on the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
- o Examine US interests and objectives in this new 21st century environment;
- o Recommend new policies and strategies to take advantage of the opportunities and protect our interests in the new European environment.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

One continuing theme of modern European history is the quest for hegemony over the European continent. In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire pushed to the gates of Vienna from the east, while the Holy Roman Empire expanded from the west under Ferdinand I of the Austrian Hapsburgs.¹ Much of the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe witnessed the Hapsburg house trying to consolidate power, beginning with the 30 Years War, 1618-1648, "a contest between the Bourbon and Hapsburg houses

for mastery of the continent of Europe."² This struggle would continue in the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1714), and the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748). A struggle between two "German" dynasties (Frederick the Great of Prussia, Hohenzollern house; Maria Theresa of Austria, Hapsburg house) began in 1740 over possession of Silesia, and spread into a world wide war (Seven Years' War, 1756-1763).³ The Empire of Napoleon came close to achieving complete hegemony over Europe when it reached its greatest extent in 1812.⁴ Then, Germany, which was finally united under Prussian Hohenzollern leadership in 1871, tried in two world wars to achieve European hegemony. In the post war period, NATO was formed to thwart Soviet attempts at hegemony.

Focusing more narrowly on the 19th and 20th centuries, two constants of European experience have been war and revolution -- there have been 72 wars or revolutions in Europe. These include many conflicts of narrow scope -- three Spanish civil wars (1820-23, 1840-43, 1936-39), three wars of German unification (Danish-Prussian 1864, 7-weeks War 1866, Franco-Prussian War 1870-71), four Cretan Rebellions (1821-22, 1866-68, 1896, 1935), three Russo-Turkish wars (1806-12, 1828-29, 1877-78) -- as well as the larger European wars -- the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815), World War I (1914-1918), and World War II (1939-45). In the 150-year period from 1800 to 1950, European states were at war in Europe for 118 years.⁵ Thus, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney risked trivializing the magnitude of the accomplishment

in Europe during the last half century when he said in a recent television interview that the peace dividend is peace.

That the second half of the 20th century was uniquely stable in Europe did not come about by accident. It resulted from a unique security framework with four identifiable components:

- o A unambiguous commitment of the United States to the collective security of Europe,
- o Nuclear deterrence,
- o The de facto division of Europe into two armed camps,
- o The division of the German state.

The commitment of the United States to collective security did not come easily: Isolationism runs deep in the American psyche. The presidents who committed the U.S. to involvement in the two World Wars ran on platforms of keeping American boys out of a European war. Only extraordinary circumstances stirred American involvement; and after the end of World War I, the Senate effectively decoupled America from the security framework in Europe by failing to ratify the peace treaty of Versailles and failing to ratify the covenant establishing the League of Nations. Even after World War II, the United States largely demobilized and attempted to return to isolationism. Given the failure of the post-World War I isolationist policies and the success of the post-World War II collective security policies, the lessons from the 20th century should be clear: the United States cannot divorce itself from the fate of Europe.

and American commitment to European security is essential to maintain peace. Our commitment has been made manifest by the presence of American servicemen on the ground in Europe, backed up by US based forces committed to NATO, and by the American strategic nuclear forces.

The post-war framework in Europe has also been characterized by divisions -- the division of Europe into two armed camps and the division of Germany. The post-war division of Europe has been a marked departure from previous divisions which were based upon a "balance of power". As Hugh Hanning observed in assessing the "balance of power", "The system depended on guess-work by governments about each others' intentions, and guesswork did not prove a reliable foundation for peace.... Sooner or later (the system of alliances) always over-balanced;... and when this happened the whole apparatus collapsed."⁶ By contrast, NATO's charter and its policy of deterrence backed up by a credible strategy of flexible response have left little room for miscalculation in the mind of an aggressor. The strategy of flexible response rests on "the tight and indissoluble coupling of conventional forces and nuclear weapons on the European continent with the strategic potential of the United States."⁷ This strategy has confronted the Soviet Union with "the incalculable risk that any military conflict between the two Alliances could escalate to a nuclear war,"⁸ initially on the tactical level, but ultimately linked to the U.S. strategic nuclear capability.

If a divided Europe was part of the post-war framework, so was a divided Germany. The division of Germany needs to be seen in the context of the "united" German experience. Bismarck united Germany through three wars, the last being the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. This united Germany contained much of current Poland, and parts of France and Russia, but it did not truly unify Germany. Bismarck unified only parts of Germany which he could constrain under Hohenzollern rule. This excluded major German populations in Austria-Hungary, which remained under Hapsburg rule.⁹ Sadly, that which Bismarck united in three quick wars was to take Europe two World Wars, and 70 million deaths¹⁰ to divide.

Each component of the post-war security framework described above now seems to be crumbling. German reunification appears to be a foregone conclusion. As for the rest of the security framework, noted historian Steven E. Ambrose recently recommended, "we no longer need NATO. It was formed to meet a threat that has disappeared.... In response to the collapse of communism and of the Warsaw Pact, we should bring the boys home. All of them. Now." He continued, "In the nuclear age, it is perfectly clear that superpowers cannot fight each other."¹¹ However clear it may be that the old security framework is dissolving, it is also clear from history that developing a new security framework for Europe which preserves peace and stability will not be easy.

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CHAPTER II

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Try as they might to do otherwise, most planners end up visualizing the future as a straight line projection of the present. Defense planners have assumed the Warsaw pact will remain a viable alliance in the future. In doing so, they assume that planning for a Warsaw Pact attack is the worst case -- that security requirements will be diminished if the Pact collapses. The problem with defense planning based on worst case assumptions is that it tends to focus on our vulnerabilities, and consequently runs the risk of missing opportunities. In a similar manner, some congressional and media critics of the Defense Department want to make a straight line projection into the future using the watershed events of 1989 as their base line. For them, peace is breaking out all over, there is no threat, and we will soon see Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as Jeffersonian democracies and free markets. The problem with the optimistic projections of the critics is that they are unrealistic and run the risk of inviting a return to the instability which has characterized Europe throughout most of its history.

This forecast hopes to avoid both of the pitfalls described above. To paraphrase the Cheshire cat, which way we ought to go in the near term depends on where we want to get to in the future. By looking to the initial decades of the 21st century without assuming that Europe will look much the same as today,

one can begin to answer the Cheshire cat's question. The vision of the future described here is not a worst case scenario; it is full of opportunities for the United States. It is also not an unduly optimistic vision which assumes away all of the threats and dangers. This paper will question fundamental policies and strategies, such as containment, deterrence, flexible response, and forward defense. Will these be relevant in the 21st century?

CENTRAL EUROPE

The future in Europe needs to be visualized through the lens of the changing political, economic and military landscape in this region. Yesterday, Eastern Europe was shrouded in communism, dominated by the Soviet Army; today, democracy is pushing aside totalitarian governments with unbelievable rapidity. In visualizing the future, it is more useful to see Europe not as two regions, East and West, but as four distinct regions: Western Europe, Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Soviet Union. Central Europe includes West Germany, East Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The Balkans include Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Turkey.

What shape will Europe take in the next century? The world witnessed democratic revolutions throughout Central Europe in 1989. It is difficult today to predict the outcome of these revolutions; much of central Europe remains in a state of economic and political transition. One conclusion however seems clear: The driving force shaping the future of Central Europe

will be a united Germany. East Germany is uniting with West Germany today at the rate of more than 2,000 people per day as East Germans move west looking for a better life.' In order to prevent a total collapse of the East German economy and society, some unification is essential and imminent. In the initial decades of the 21st Century, I expect to see a united Germany confined, for the time being, to the existing borders of the GDR and the FRG. It will be far and away the largest economic power in Europe, with a GNP roughly the size of France and Great Britain combined. (Keeping the German economic power in perspective, it will still be only roughly 1/4 the GNP of the US). This vision of Germany and Europe in the future presents challenges for the United States, especially in the security arrangement into which a united Germany will fit.

Two alternative security arrangements for Germany in the next century are plausible: a united but neutral Germany with a status similar to Austria, or a unified Germany linked to a western alliance (presumably NATO). As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, a neutral Germany has a surface plausibility, but underlying this structure are grave dangers. "An Austrian-type neutral solution for Germany would create a single block from the French-German frontier to the Polish-Soviet border of states with similar international status and therefore propelled toward joint diplomacy. Surely there is no better formula for eventual German hegemony over Central Europe or a long-term German-Russian conflict."² Kissinger argues persuasively for

Germany remaining in NATO, and that NATO will continue to be "needed for the internal West European balance and as a guarantee of European security."³

In Central Europe, only West Germany, and Austria have deep democratic traditions, democratic infrastructures and market economies. All of the remaining countries are in the midst of political revolutions, accompanied by economic revolutions. Their democratic future is by no means assured. The difficulties experienced by Latin American countries in making the transition to democracy may be a good measure of the difficulties which lie ahead in Central Europe. For example, although Argentina had its first popularly elected president in 1916, the history of Argentina's movement to democracy has been characterized by dictatorships, corruption, military coups, anarchy and uncontrolled inflation.⁴ In addition to the economic and political problems, Central Europe has some built in cleavages, among them the mixture of ethnic groups within states (Czechoslovakia is 64% Czech and 31% Slovak, with a 4% Hungarian minority), and ethnic groups dispersed in adjacent countries (eg. Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia). In Central Europe as elsewhere, there is no historical blueprint for a transition from a communist political and economic system to democracy and a free market economy -- the future holds a slow painful process based on trial and error.

While Central Europe faces tremendous political and economic challenges, some countries will make a successful transition to stable democracies with market economies by the

beginning of the 21st century. These countries are likely to be those who have the greatest democratic traditions (eg. Czechoslovakia), and those who are able to solve the economic challenges without a total collapse of basic social services, a collapse which would build up pressures for an authoritarian solution. When viewed from the perspective of the initial decades of the 21st century, I expect these new democracies to follow the Austrian model: neutral, western style countries with close ties to Western Europe economically, but without explicit security ties to the western security establishment. I would further expect some bilateral security arrangements with the Soviet Union to continue, especially for Poland as it looks west and sees a united Germany.

THE BALKANS

If the situation in Central Europe has some positive aspects, a far more difficult road lies ahead for the new democracies in the Balkans. Although Greece and Turkey have some considerable experience with democracy, the history of the region is not encouraging. While World War I produced many European democracies, "democracy sank shallow roots in the countries of southeastern Europe, where the peasantry was illiterate and the middle class underdeveloped or, in certain areas, virtually nonexistent. Parliamentary governments rose and fell, undermined by corrupt and meddling monarchs and by ethnic passions that refused to subside."⁶ The conclusion of the democratic revolution of 1989, begun with such high expectations, remains in doubt; an ultimate fall into anarchy

looms as one real possibility.

While the Balkans have even more difficult economic and political challenges than new Central European democracies, the dominant forces in the Balkans in the initial decades of the next century will be divisive forces of nationalism and religion. As the Soviet Army withdraws to the western portion of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact will cease to exist as a viable military alliance. In the Balkans, many ethnic and religious difficulties are likely to come to the front when the Soviet Army leaves. Romania has a Hungarian minority of 8%;⁶ Bulgaria is 9% Turkish and 13% Muslim⁷; Yugoslavia has 36% Serbs, 20% Croat, 9% Muslim, and 8% Albanians⁸. Furthermore, almost all of the Balkan countries have multiple border disputes. Conflict in the Balkans appears rooted in old and intractable animosities. For example, in Yugoslavia, while the conflict between 8.6 million Orthodox Serbs and the 4.6 million Catholic Croats dates back to the First World War, the conflict in southern Yugoslavia between the Serbs and the Albanians "has its roots in the Battle of Kosovo Polje, in 1389."⁹ Furthermore, Yugoslavia has border disputes with Albania, Bulgaria and Italy.¹⁰ Even the two democracies in the region, Greece and Turkey, have a long history of conflict, most recently in 1974 over Cyprus. Clearly, a key challenge for the future appears to be the creation of a stable economic and political environment which does not accentuate the ethnic and religious differences within this region.

Once again there is no blueprint for the future based upon the past. Soviet domination of the Balkans is really just the most recent in a long line of outside domination. Soviet domination replaced German domination, which replaced Ottoman domination, which dated back to the 16th century. States in the Balkans have seldom been truly free. Thus, the probability that some countries will fall into either anarchy or authoritarian rule is real: Albania is already there, and the long term prospects for Romania appear problematical.

THE SOVIET UNION

If the changes to date have been most evident in Central Europe and the Balkans, the Soviet Union is not far behind. However, the Soviet Union is distinct in its cultural and historical development, and I believe the changes there will take a different path. Cyril E. Black has observed, "In seeking to draw conclusions of contemporary significance from the long historical record of the peoples of Russia, it is important to identify the recurring patterns of behavior that give evidence of the characteristic conditioning of peoples with a common historical experience."¹¹ He goes on to cite five themes of Russian history which provide a continuity of perspective, even over the momentous changes which occurred in the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, and presumably over the changes occurring today. These five themes are:

- o the predominant role of the state;
- o values that stress collective at the expense of

- individual interests;
- o a purposeful economic policy;
 - o a multinational society;
 - o an international position of relative insecurity.'²

Communism was not implanted in the Soviet Union from outside. Twenty million Soviet deaths in the Great Patriotic War legitimized communism in the Soviet Union; thus communism does not suffer from the same crisis of legitimacy that led to its quick demise in Eastern Europe. Not only is there no tradition of democratic institutions in the Soviet Union, there is a rich and consistent tradition of totalitarian or authoritarian rule and of subjugating individual interests to collective values. While Gorbachev may be transferring power from the Communist Party to the government, the 21st century will welcome a Soviet government that is far from a truly representative democracy. I expect to see the Soviet Union remain an authoritarian state with continued communist direction. While some alternative parties may be permitted, this change should be viewed as a tactical shift, not a fundamental retreat from Marxist doctrine.

A bigger question than whether communism will survive in the Soviet Union is whether the Soviet internal empire will survive under the pressures of the nationalities problem. As Gail Lapidus observed recently, "The complexity of the nationalities question in contemporary Soviet politics stems from the fact that the key actors are not merely dispersed

ethnic groups, as in the United States, but nations and nationalities inhabiting or laying claim to historical territorial homelands. Over one hundred such national groups -- differing in language, culture, historical experience, religion, and level of economic and social development -- make up the Soviet population today, with Russians comprising just over half the total."¹³ As the external empire, Eastern Europe, breaks away, centrifugal pressures will mount to spin some of the nationalities off into separate countries. These centrifugal forces are most evident in the Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in the republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But additional pressures lie under the surface in Moldavia (which is essentially a Romanian republic adjacent to Romania), and the Ukraine. While it may be possible for the Soviet Union to allow a looser commonwealth association with some of these republics (eg. the Baltic republics), there is a point past which no Soviet leader can compromise. Maintaining an internal empire that includes the Ukraine is a survival interest for the Soviet Union.

Viewing the Soviet Union as over 100 nationalities with 30,000 nuclear weapons is a sobering image. This image is more disturbing when the economic problems are added to the equation. Soviet observers have recently reported that the Soviet economy is now at its worst state since its recovery from the Second World War. It is essentially the economic crisis in the Soviet Union which will force Gorbachev to withdraw his forces from

Eastern Europe and to restructure his military to a smaller, more affordable, but still formidable, size. There are two fundamental causes of the economic crisis. First, Soviet leaders are either unwilling or unable to cut loose from a bankrupt economic theory. Notwithstanding perestroika, central planning of the economy continues with little hope of fundamental change. Second, perhaps because of 70 years of communism, Soviet workers lack the initiative and entrepreneurial spirit essential for a free market economy.

The fate of the Soviet Union in the initial decades of the 21st century is not clear; there is a range of possible outcomes. The most improbable scenario is that the Soviet Union will be able to resolve satisfactorily both its economic and ethnic problems. It is possible that the Soviet Union may collapse into anarchy under the dual pressures of the nationalities problem and a dysfunctional economy. On the other hand, it is also possible that the Soviet Union may be able to avoid a systemic collapse, and simply muddle through with intermittent spurts of progress. Or, what I believe is the most likely scenario, the Soviet Union may shrink to a smaller, more coherent core of republics, shedding the peripheral Baltic and Altic republics. Whichever road the Soviet Union takes, it will continue to be a significant force in Europe; and if it collapses into anarchy, 30,000 nuclear weapons will represent a real threat to world peace.

Summarizing my vision of Europe in the 21st Century, Western Europe will move toward greater economic integration and

political cooperation, while falling short of a "United States of Europe" because of nationalistic, cultural and ethnic forces. The Soviet Union will withdraw its forces back to the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact will cease to exist as a viable military alliance. A united Germany will be the driving force in Central Europe, leading a number of emerging democracies which will make the transition to representative government and market economies. Some remaining Central European countries may adopt authoritarian governments under the pressure of economic problems and collapsing services. In the Balkans, the chance of a large number of states successfully transforming to democracy and free economies is far more problematic. Here the economic and political problems are more intractable than in Central Europe, and the divisive forces of nationalism and religious differences, coupled with border disputes, present extremely difficult challenges. The Balkans will once again become the powder keg of Europe. The Soviet Union will remain an authoritarian state, directed by communism; however, the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union will transform the federation into a smaller core of Slavic, non-Moslem republics, including Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia and Byelorussia. A number of small countries thus formed from the breakup of part of the Soviet Union will remain in a loose commonwealth arrangement with the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER III
US NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In National Security Strategy of the United States, a 1988 report to the Congress, President Ronald Reagan quotes Walter Lippmann concerning the enduring quality of national interests "...the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interests. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent ... There is no great mystery why this should be: the facts of geography are permanent ... thus successive generations of men tend to face the same recurrent problems and to react to them in more or less habitual ways."¹ While changing personalities and unfolding events may change the circumstances in which the United States finds itself, the 21st century national interests and objectives are likely to remain consistent with those articulated by President Reagan:

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide opportunities for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors.
3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
4. The growth of human freedom, democratic

institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.

5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

In order to achieve U.S. national interests, objectives can be established to guide in policy formulation.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies.

2. To respond to the challenges of the global economy.

3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world.

4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world.

5. To build effective and friendly relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concerns.²

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

If the future does not include the Warsaw pact as a viable military alliance, if the Soviet Union withdraws its military forces from Eastern Europe and restructures them to lower force levels, is there a future threat in Europe to U.S. national interests and objectives? The fundamental lesson of the 20th century is that the interests of the United States are tied in an inextricable way to the collective security and stability of Europe. An examination of European history demonstrates the essentially fragile nature of peace and stability there and the need for U.S. active participation in European collective

security to insure peace. The basis for our national strategy must remain "the conviction that the United States' most basic national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state or group of states were to dominate the Eurasian land mass."³

Although the Soviet Union may fall from the ranks of a true world superpower by the initial decades of the 21st century, it will clearly remain the largest land power in Europe. Even if the current 214-division Soviet Army with 5.5 million men and 53,000 tanks⁴ is cut dramatically, the Soviet Union will remain a powerful military force on the European continent, possibly structured at slightly over 100 divisions and 2.5 million men, manned and equipped at increased readiness levels. At the same time the Soviet Union reduces and restructures, the rest of European and U.S. forces will be substantially reduced. Even a united Germany, which will presumably have the economic wherewith-all to sustain military expenditures, will have a substantially smaller force than the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet conventional forces are going to be reduced in the 21st century, Soviet nuclear forces will remain capable of massive destruction. As is true today, the Soviet Union will continue to be the only country on earth capable of destroying the U.S. The Soviet Union has today approximately 1400 ICBMs (some with as many as 10 warheads), over 1000 SLBMs, and 860 strategic aircraft. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues strategic nuclear modernization with the SS-18 Mod 5 ICBM, the road-mobile SS-25 ICBM, and the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM.⁵ Even

if these weapons are for purely deterrence use, the thought of massive nuclear destructive power in a politically and economically fragile Soviet Union, gives even greater emphasis to the conclusion that the United States' vital interests are served by a stable and peaceful Europe.

Two additional threats to U.S. national interests in Europe exist: potential threats from the south, and the potential for an unintended breakdown in the international order in the Balkans or Central Europe. There exist to the south of Europe cleavages between Muslim and Christian interests which have already boiled over into fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon.

There are over 28 million Muslims in the Soviet Union.⁶ Muslim Turkey and Christian Greece have been at war five times this century (1st and 2nd Balkan Wars, 1912-13; Greco-Turkish war of 1921-22; Cypriot wars of 1963-64, and 1973).⁷ Muslim minorities exist throughout the Balkans, most notably in Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, while Christians are a minority in Albania.⁸ Add to this built-in friction the historical instability of the region -- the Balkans problem, which was the proximate cause for World War I -- and the 21st century threats to peace and stability in the region will be substantial.

In addition to challenges and threats to U.S. interests, the 21st century will bring opportunities. One of the major objectives in support of U.S. interests will continue to be "to defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human

rights...". The 21st century is likely to find a number of additional democratic states in Central Europe, with Czechoslovakia having the greatest potential for democracy, followed by Hungary and Poland. Some potential for additional democracies in the Balkans also exists. These democratic states will need an extended security umbrella from the West, just as Austria implicitly enjoys now.

Thus, it is clear that the national interests and objectives of the United States in the 21st century will remain consistent with our historical interests and objectives, with fundamental interests in maintaining peace and stability in Europe, and with preventing a hostile state achieving hegemony over Europe. Threats to U.S. national interests in the region will include the Soviet Union, Muslim fundamentalism to the south, and the disintegration of the international order in Central Europe or the Balkans due to either economic problems or ethnic and territorial strife. The major opportunities for the U.S. involve the expansion of democracy and free market economic systems to a number of European countries.

ENDNOTES

1. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C. US Government, 1988, p. 1.
2. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. Richard Cheney, Soviet Military Power: Prospective for Change 1989, Washington, D.C., US Government, 1989, p. 103.
5. Ibid., pp. 42-46.
6. CIA US Government, The World Factbook, Washington, D.C., US Government, 1989, p. 273.
7. George Kohn, Dictionary of Wars, New York, Facts on File Publications, 1986, p. 547.
8. CIA US Government, pp. 2, 44, 327.
9. Reagan, p. 4.

CHAPTER IV

U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Two national security policies which have guided us in the past are containment, and flexible response. Keeping in mind the historical context of Europe, and the vision forecast for the initial decades of the 21st century, what national security policies will best further our national interests and objectives?

The next decades will no doubt witness the ultimate victory of the containment policy. George Kennan recommended in 1947 that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹ He saw correctly "that Soviet power ... bears within it the seeds of its own decay," ² although this decay took somewhat longer than the "period of ten to fifteen years" Kennan foresaw. While containment has served the United States well for nearly a half century, it is too narrowly crafted to meet the needs of advancing our national interests in the 21st century. Stability needs to replace containment as the driving policy for the future. It will be necessary to see the world in more complex terms, where "Russian expansive tendencies" and world communism are no longer the sole or even leading threats to our national interests. In the next century, the Soviets are only one of many forces which may destabilize the world: In fact Soviets may play a constructive role in stabilizing certain areas.

However, as our national interests and objectives make clear, we are not seeking a status quo stability, but rather a dynamic stability. We must emphasize dynamic participation with Western Europe, the Soviet Union and Central European and Balkan states in processes to foster the development of stable democracies with market economies integrated into the international order. In executing this policy, the political, economic, and socio-psychological elements of national power should play leading, dynamic roles; while military power would only rarely be used overtly, although the credible threat to use force will remain useful and enable the other elements of national power to be successful.

If the United States moves from a policy of containment to one of dynamic stability, where does this leave the policy of deterrence based upon flexible response? We will need the ability to dissuade our enemies from taking actions contrary to our vital national interests, and the use of force or the threat of force will continue to be the ultimate arbiter. However, nuclear weapons will decrease in their utility. A relatively small strategic nuclear capability will no doubt continue to be required well into the 21st century as a deterrent at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, but the policies of deterrence and flexible response require substantial modification. Dissuasion in the 21st century will rely more on highly capable conventional forces to back up economic and political power, and less on the nuclear component of flexible response.

If the policies of dynamic stability and dissuasion replace

containment, deterrence and flexible response, what strategies are appropriate to implement these policies? For many historical reasons, it is clear that our most basic national security interests would be threatened if a hostile force were to achieve hegemony over the European continent. To this commitment, the United States needs to add a commitment to insuring stability throughout Europe, a stability in which democratic institutions and free markets can grow and flourish. Europe must remain our first out-of-country national security priority in the 21st century. In fact, our "sphere of concern" in Europe will expand to the stability of newly formed democratic nations in Central Europe and the Balkans. This strategy must continue to make the U.S. commitment manifest and credible in order to insure peace and to dissuade potential threats. Although reduced, U.S. forces must continue to be forward deployed in Europe, possibly in a more central reserve position than now, since they are essential to make our commitment manifest.

The strategy for continued U.S. involvement in the stability of Europe should be built upon the foundation of NATO. While it may be true that NATO was formed as a political and military alliance in response to the threat of the Soviet Union, NATO has evolved over its 40 years of existence. If the overt threat of the Soviet Union will be markedly decreased in the 21st century, the threats to stability in Europe will not have vanished. An alliance of like-minded nations provides an

important political and military counterbalance to the threats of instability. A united Germany tied to NATO can provide a stabilizing and democratic influence in Central Europe. In the same way, Greece and Turkey as NATO members provide a "fire break" between the powder keg of the Balkans and the volatile Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey's membership in NATO draws that Muslim country toward Europe rather than on the slippery slope toward the Middle East. NATO offers the United States a mechanism to influence and regulate potential conflicts and instability in Europe, and it is the only concrete way for the Europeans to assure themselves of the continued commitment of the United States to collective security.

As mentioned earlier, a unified Germany in the 21st century presents a number of security challenges. Germany's position in Central Europe is key, and it is essential that the new security framework for Europe capitalize upon 45 years of democratic cooperation among the states of Western Europe rather than allow historical animosities to resurface. In a practical sense, this means continuing the German participation in both NATO and the European Economic Community structures. The worst of all worlds for U.S. national interests -- and for Europe -- would be a dissolved NATO, and a unified Germany, newly armed with nuclear weapons, which decides to go it alone. This situation would leave three nuclear powers on the continent of Europe, and a return to the old balance of power strategy which proved so disastrous in the past. U.S. continued involvement in NATO provides the nuclear umbrella essential to Germany's continued

security.

While NATO is essential in the future, the NATO strategy of forward defense will need to be replaced in the 21st century. Absent a Warsaw Pact poised on West Germany's border there is no credible immediate threat which requires the forward defense strategy. If the Soviet Union attacks, it will first have to attack through Central Europe. The more likely scenario for armed conflict involves a regional instability in the Balkans. In either case, NATO will need a strategy which provides stability and security outside the narrow alliance boundaries. The military component of this strategy would place a premium on theater mobility and an ability to respond in combined manner throughout Europe across the spectrum of conflict. Furthermore, the strategy must have substantial economic, political and socio-psychological components which take a active role consistent with the policy of dynamic stability. Finally, the strategy needs to be crafted in such a way that it does not overtly threaten the Soviet Union.

The final strategy needed to implement the policies described above is arms reductions. As we move toward the 21st century, arms reduction agreements will solidify the gains made in the 1990s. Even if the Soviet Union were to agree unilaterally to major arms reductions, the strategy of negotiating arms reduction agreements offers greater stability, if only through the mechanism of verification. The on site inspections made by all parties to arms negotiations agreements

have a very positive effect on confidence and security. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union unilaterally reduces its arms this decade, there is nothing to prevent them from unilaterally rearming in future decades. The policy of dissuasion, with its greater reliance on conventional capabilities rather than nuclear flexible response, places a further premium on negotiated and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

CONCLUSIONS

In the initial decades of the 21st century, the western world must fashion a substantially different economic, political and security order in Europe. As the half-century old security framework based upon the division of Germany and the division of Europe dissolves, the opportunity exists to replace it with one that achieves a similar degree of peace and security. The outline of the new security framework for Europe should have the following components:

- o Continued manifest commitment of the U.S. to the collective security of Europe (extending beyond the boundaries of NATO to include the democratic countries of Central Europe and the Balkans);
- o Less dependence on nuclear deterrence, and a greater reliance on dissuasion based on the economic, political and socio-psychological elements of national power along with capable conventional forces;
- o Emphasis on dynamic stability and the growth of democracy and prosperity rather than the containment of world communism;

o The democratic cooperation of European states rather than the division of the German state.

I have suggested throughout this paper that one must first have a vision of the future security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests before one can hope to choose a coherent path for the near and intermediate term. I have described this vision of the future and the policies and strategies appropriate to this new environment. The vision serves as an objective towards which the U.S. must sail. In the near term, the United States must navigate through some difficult times, holding a steady course despite the ambiguous nature of the current threat.

We are leaving a period in which the Warsaw Pact posed an overwhelming conventional threat to NATO and the security of Europe. In the past, the threat has been straightforward, and policy formulation has likewise been direct and widely supported. The Warsaw Pact is today far less coherent a threat in terms both of its capabilities and intentions. The Soviet Union's military capability today remains largely intact, but the circumstances in which it finds itself argue strongly that the Soviet Union is a greatly reduced threat. The threat of instability is ambiguous, and it will require wisdom and insight to forge a supportable policy for the future.

During the period of transition the United States and its European allies have an epic opportunity. If NATO's resolve and if U.S. commitment to collective security remain intact, we have the opportunity to fundamentally change the face of Europe and

the world. Through nuclear arms reductions the opportunity exists to dramatically reduce the chances of nuclear war. Through conventional arms reduction negotiations (CFE), we can negotiate a level of conventional arms which achieves parity in the Atlantic to Urals region at significantly lower levels for both sides. The political process unfolding in Eastern Europe is achieving at least a partial restationing of Soviet forces back to the western Soviet Union; the opportunity for a number of Eastern European states to move to democracy and free market economies during this decade is very real.

The greatest risk for the United States is that it will shrink from the challenges and responsibilities of being a Super Power. The 21st century should be the century of freedom and democracy. However, there will be many who will urge the United States to focus on its internal problems, to slide back to isolationism. In order to consolidate the victories of democracy, it will be necessary for the United States to marshal its resources, its energy and its highest ideals in the pursuit of stability, freedom and peace.

ENDNOTES

1. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, 25, July 1947, p. 574.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 580.

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